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Abstract.  This article illustrates several interpretive difficulties in employing personnel security criteria 
in the context of national security. 
 
IBPP has published many articles (available in its electronic archives) concerning the interpretive 
difficulties in employing personnel security criteria.  Most saliently, any criterion suffers from the 
necessary leap required from an individual’s status on that criterion to the problematic or desirable 
behavior that personnel security authorities are trying to prevent or encourage respectively.  The “sure-
thing” prediction is never a sure thing. 
 
Now, there are many common attributions one might make to explain anything involved in living in a 
world that is sure-thingless.  This might apply to the exact status of an individual on a criterion.  Or the 
exact weights of criteria contributing to a putative sure-thing prediction.  In fact, the very human 
enterprise of creating predictions may be significantly based on inadequacies and peculiarities of 
sensation, perception, cognition, motivation, emotion, and behavior that render the value of the 
enterprise not only unknown but even unknowable. 
 
Yet, throughout human history, there have been large numbers of personnel security authorities who 
are True Believers in the sure-thingness of their criteria and how individuals stack up on them.  In the 
United States (US), Red Scares and McCarthyisms are but two exemplars of how sure-thingness goes 
wrong. 
 
The Issue is not whether formal membership, informal association, and ideological and intrapsychic 
activity in pursuits formally or informally labeled as Communist should have been or should be grounds 
for investigation and analysis.  Historical data clearly show that many individuals involved in various 
combinations of the above worked against the security interests of the US through sabotage, espionage, 
and agency of influence. 
 
However, not all Communist-tainted individuals worked in this manner, while at least some other non-
Communists did.  And the psychological dynamics that fueled a relentless quest to identify Communists, 
the sure-thing identification of Communist with behavior working against the security interests of the 
US, and the resulting misidentification of some individuals as Communist and as working against the US 
worked against the security of the US.  Out of these dynamics rose the genesis of false positive and false 
negative errors of personnel security. 
 
The above is a preamble to the notice (Broad, 2002) that new data (Herken, 2002) suggest more strongly 
than previously that the scientific leader of the US effort to develop “the atom bomb,” J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, was a Communist.  It is interesting that the explicator of these data concurrently suggests 
that Oppenheimer was not engaged in espionage, sabotage, or other problematic behavior against the 
US.  In fact, Herken notes that the personnel security criterion of “Communist” may have become 
something for Oppenheimer to hide or to feel uncomfortable about.  That is, much as an incompetent 
physician can create iatrogenic insult to the body, personnel security authorities through their 
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construction of criteria and management of the security system may have created damage to the body 
politic.  This damage would have been associated with pressures to hide what one should not have had 
to hide, to seem exploitable in the eyes of hostile intelligence services, and to furnish less than one’s 
best because part of one’s psychology was having to address the shadow of discovery and potential 
exploitation. 
 
A counter to the above analysis is that the Communist label should have been enough to bar anyone 
from nuclear weapons work, especially with the hindsight that some Communists were committing 
espionage for the Soviet Union and its allies.  A counter to this counter is that personnel security is 
ultimately about doing the best possible to guard against behavior injurious to one’s country, 
organizations, other people, or oneself.  Assuming Oppenheimer might have been a Communist but was 
not working against the US and assuming his extraordinary demonstrated value to the World War II 
effort, one might well conclude that misidentifying a Communist as non-Communist might have been in 
the security interests of the US.  (See Broad, W.  (September 8, 2002).  Book contends chief of A-bomb 
team was once a communist.  The New York Times, p. A26; Herken, G.  (2002). Brotherhood of the 
bomb.  Henry Holt; McFarland, S.  (1998). Communism as religion. International Journal for the 
Psychology of Religion, 8, 33-48; Sani, F., & Reicher, S.  (1991). When consensus fails: An analysis of the 
schism within the Italian Communist Party (1991).  European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 623-645; 
Schmitt, D.P., & Winter, D.G.  (1998). Measuring the motives of Soviet leadership and Soviet society: 
Congruence reflected or congruence created?  Leadership Quarterly, 9, 293-307.)  (Keywords: 
Communism, Oppenheimer, Personnel Security.) 
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